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Fragmentation of Liberal Parties in Russia

Party development in post-communist Russia has been
highly disorganized.

The chaotic formation, dissolution,

and reformation of parties that has been so characteristic
of the past decade has its roots in several aspects of
Russian politics.

First and most basically, the structure

of Russia's national government and its electoral process
are not conducive to a coherent party system.

The way in

which political parties form and develop are extensively
shaped by the government in which they operate, and
Russia's system of government has had a negative effect on
the strength of its parties.

Party development has also

faced challenges from taking place after the fall of a
long-standing oppressive regime, in terms of both the
mentality of voters and politicians and the political
climate in which parties began to form.

One lingering

problem in the party system that is beginning to take shape
is that of coordination among like-minded parties.

Parties

with similar ideologies have conSistently competed against
one another in elections, often leading to outcomes based
on which ideologies are represented by the fewest parties,
rather than which ones are supported by the most voters.
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The current structure of Russian government was
created by the Constitution of 1993.

This constitution

gave extensive powers to the president. The president was
to be commander-in-chief of the armed forces, would preside
over the security council, and have the power to declare
marshal law.

The prime minister was to be appointed by the

president and confirmed by the parliament; however, the
president was given the authority to dissolve the
parliament if it failed to confirm his appointee on three
consecutive occasions.

There was also no requirement that

the prime minister be a member of parliament or belong to
one of the parties represented in the parliament, and the
prime minister could be dismissed by the president at any
time without parliamentary approval.

The president was

also responsible for appointing and dismissing deputy prime
~inisters,

and required only the consent of the prime

minister to appoint and dismiss other members of the
~overrumefit.

The president eould veto

le~islatiofi

that was

passed by the parliament, but a presidential veto could be
overridden by a two-thirds majority in each house of the
legislature.

The constitution did give the parliament the

power to impeach the president; however, the procedures for
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impeachment were complex and difficult, and could only be
initiated in the most extreme circumstances. l
The constitution allowed the president to serve for a
maximum of two consecutive four-year terms.

The president

was to be directly elected in an election separate from the
legislative elections.

The president also had to be

elected by a majority of those who voted in the election;
if no candidate received greater than fifty percent of the
vote in the first round of voting, there would be a run-off
election between the two candidates receiving the greatest
number of votes. 2
The legislative branch created by the 1993
Constitution was called the Federal Assembly. It consisted
of an upper house, the Federation Council, and a lower
house, called the Duma.

The powers of the Federation

Council included approval of boundary changes, appointment
of judges to the Supreme Court upon nomination by the
president, and authorization of the use of armed forces
outside the boundaries of the state.

It also considered

legislation proposed by the Duma on matters of taxes and
currency, the budget, international treaties, and war and
peace.

I

2

It met irregularly, for one week out of every

Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and SOciety, 3rd ed. (New York: Routeledge, 2002), 104.
Christopher Marsh, Rusia at the Polls. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 2002), 59.
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three, with an additional period before these sessions for
committee meetings. 3
The Federation Council consists of 178 members, or two
from each of the eighty-nine subjects of the Russian
Federation.

Members of the council were elected by a

majoritarian method in two-member districts, with each
voter casting two votes and the top two candidates in each
district receiving seats.

This method was only used for

the 1993 elections, however, and the Federation Council has
been indirectly elected by regional governors and
legislatures in all subsequent elections. 4
The lower house of the Federal Assembly is the State
Duma.

Its powers include the approval of the president's

nomination for prime minister, although failure to approve
the nominee three consecutive times makes the president
constitutionally required to appoint his own candidate for
prime minister, dissolve the Duma, and call new elections.
The Duma also has the authority to declare its lack of
confidence in the government as a whole; however, doing so
twice within three months would also result in the
dissolution of the Duma. 5

The Duma is also responsible for

confirmation to and dismissal from certain positions, such
Sakwa, 133.
Sakwa, 134.
S Stephen White, Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist SoCiety (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 64.
3

4
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as Chairman of the State Bank, Chairman of the Accounting
Chamber, and Commissioner on Human Rights. 6

It adopts

federal legislation, which must be approved by the
Federation Council, but it can override a rejection with a
two-thirds majority on a second vote.

After this process,

legislation is still subject to presidential approval.?
The Duma is composed of 450 members, half of which are
elected in single-member districts, and the other half of
which are elected through a proportional representation
party list system.

Members are elected to four-year terms,

in elections held the year before presidential elections.
Candidates in single-member districts need only a plurality
of the votes to be elected.

In the party list races,

parties must win at least five percent of the vote in order
to receive seats in the Duma; the seats are then assigned
to individual members based on their ranking on the party
list, i.e., the higher a candidate is on the list, the more
likely he or she is to receive a seat.

Votes cast for

parties that receive less than five percent of the vote are
redistributed to the winning parties based on the
percentage of the votes each received. 8

6

White, 65.

7

Sakwa, 128.

8

Marsh, 60.
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One of the first problems the constitution adopted in
1993 presented to party development in Russia was the fact
that it wasn't adopted until 1993.

A major stimulus for

the development of parties and a party system is the
electoral process itself. 9

After the fall of the Soviet

Union in August 1991, it was over two years before Russia
held a general election.

Until the adoption of the new

constitution in 1993, parties didn't even have an electoral
system to work with, much less an election to begin
campaigning for.
Development of political parties also depends on the
parties' base in the legislature. lo

With no new elections

held between August 1991 and December 1993, the parties
that were forming had no such base to work with.

The

legislature was still composed of the old USSR Congress of
Peoples' Deputies, who had no links to the new parties and
were in no way accountable to them.II
The Constitution of 1993 also hindered party
development because of the circumstances under which it was
adopted.

When elections to the state Duma were finally

held in December 1993, conditions were less than favorable

Robert A. Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966),349.
10 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. by
Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen, 1959), 183.
11 Sakwa, 176.

9

Page 7
for running a campaign due to the military action taken
against parliament three months earlier. The constitution
was finally passed after a long stand-off between President
Boris Yeltsin and the parliament that existed at the time
under the old Soviet constitution. Both the president and
the parliament had proposed drafts for a new constitution,
with the presidential draft creating a strong presidential
system and the parliament's draft providing for significant
legislative checks on the president's power. 12

Neither side

was willing to compromise, and in order to end the
stalemate President Yeltsin dissolved the parliament in
contradiction to the existing constitution. In response,
members of parliament barricaded themselves inside the
legislative building and the head of parliament, Aleksandr
Rutskoi, declared himself acting president.

After a

deadlock lasting nearly two weeks, Yeltsin ordered military
action against the parliament, Rutskoi and his supporters
were arrested, and Yeltsin was free to introduce a
constitution creating a strong presidential system. 13

This

chain of events created circumstances for the parliamentary
elections three months later that were hostile to party
activity and a healthy campaign.

12
13

Marsh, 55-56.
White, 35.

Page 8
The party system in Russia also struggles because of
the power of the president in Russian government.

Neither

Boris Yeltsin nor Vladimir Putin ever officially joined a
political party, and Yeltsin actively promoted an image of
being ~above" partisan politics. 14

With the resources

available to a sitting president, the incumbent in a
presidential race doesn't need the support of a party to
win reelection. 15

Since a presidential election has not yet

been contested in Russia without an incumbent, partisan
candidates have always been at a disadvantage in these
races.

With the disparity in power between the president

and the legislature, Duma elections may seem relatively
unimportant.

This fact combined with a presidency that has

eschewed association with political parties reduces the
effect voters think they can have on government by
supporting a political party.
Another major cause of the weakness of Russian
political parties comes from their formation in a declining
communist regime.

The development of a legal multi-party

system in Russia began with the amendment of the Soviet
constitution in 1990 to allow the existence of parties
other than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).
14 Timothy J. Colton, Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), lOS.
15 White, 97.
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Article 6 of the constitution, which had officially
recognized the CPSU as the "leading and guiding force of
Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of
all state organizations and public organizations" was
amended to read "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
and other political parties, as well as trade union, youth,
and other public organizations and mass movements,
participate in shaping the policies of the Soviet state and
in running state and public affairs through their
representatives elected to the soviets of people's deputies
and in other ways."16

The constitution was also revised to

include Article 51, which expressly stated that citizens
had the right to "unite in political parties and public
organizations and to participate in mass movements
contributing to their greater political activity and to the
satisfaction of their diverse interests."17
With a legal framework for their existence in place, a
large number of parties began to emerge.

By the end of

1990, there were over 450 political organizations in

Russia,18 and by August 1991, almost one hundred of these
had developed into recognizable political parties, although

White, 36.
White, 36.
18 Sakwa, 174.

16
17
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many had only a few hundred members and few had members in
the Soviet republics outside Russia. 19
Many of the parties that emerged at this time were
able to achieve success as parties of opposition to the
CPSU. By campaigning on negative platforms based solely on
opposition to the communist regime, parties were able to
exploit the CPSU's unpopularity to win victories with a
minimum of organizational or intellectual resources. 20

The

parties had no need to develop a positive program or define
a clear ideological position of their own.

The consequence

of this type of development was that the resulting parties
were organizationally and ideologically weak.

The parties

that developed in these circumstances were characterized
by:
"numerical weakness, weak and amorphous organizational
structures (particularly at the local level), regionalism,
ideological vagueness and a negativism bordering on
populism, and low-caliber leaders who, for the sake of
self-affirmation, actively set themselves up against other
parties, even ones that were ideologically close to them."21
Once the CPSU was no longer a power, parties could not
exist solely as opposition to it, and had to develop
Sakwa, 174.
Sakwa, 175.
21 Vyacheslav Nikonov, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 August 1992, P 5, quoted in Richard Sakwa, Russian
Politics and Society, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 175.
19

20
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platforms beyond just a vague support for democracy.

The

already numerous parties began dividing over conflicting
viewpoints on political, economic, and nationality policy.
The absence of the CPSU removed the incentive for parties
opposed to it to unite, and the parties became polarized
not only because of divergent programs, but also because of
the

~irreconcilable"

style of politics, in which any

difference in issue stances became a barrier to cooperation
between parties, that became the standard for most
parties. 22
Another legacy of the Soviet Union's one-party system
was the stigma surrounding the word "party" in Russia,
where the only concept that most people had of a political
party was the old CPSU.

For this reason many parties in

Russia prefer to be called

~electoral

blocs" or

~public

associations," and many voters still remain wary of joining
a party. 23
Russia's party system also faced unusual fragmentation
because of its sudden development.

In an established party

system, when small parties develop and gather support, they
are usually absorbed by one of the larger, established
parties who add the smaller party's issues to their

22
23

Sakwa, 176.
White, 36.
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platform. 24

New concerns and constituencies thus become

represented by the major parties in government.

In Russia,

a party for every possible interest and segment of society
developed at the same time and on equal footing, which led
to a chaotic plethora of parties rather than the gradual
additions to major parties that smaller parties usually
become.

Without the larger established parties, the small

parties continue to exist on their own, competing with
other small parties that may be ideologically similar to
them.
Another weakness of Russian political parties is that
they are frequently built around the personality of their
leaders, rather than around clear issue stances or
ideological viewpoints.

Without firmly established

reputations, party leaders are usually the clearest
association voters can make with a given party.

In fact,

parties are colloquially referred to by the names of their
leaders, such as "the party of Zhirinovsky" for LDPR, or
"the party of Yavlinsky" for Yabloko. 25

Personality basis

presents several problems for a party.

Obviously, when a

party is based entirely on one person's leadership, the
party's very existence is tenuous because the leader could

24

25

Duverger, 290.
Colton, 174-175.
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die, retire, or leave the party for some other reason.
Also, focusing attention on personality detracts from the
development of a clear and stable ideology and issue
platform that would provide a lasting foundation for the
party.
The political parties that have developed in Russia
since the fall of the Soviet Union can be grouped into four
broad ideological families: communist, right-wing
nationalist~

pro-government center, and liberal reformista 26

The communist parties consist mainly of former members
of the CPSU. When the CPSU was officially banned in 1992,
several successor parties had already begun to form.

Most

of these parties, including the Socialist Party of Working
People (SPWP) and the Union of Communists, combined to form
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), which
claims to be the official successor party to the CPSU.
Some extremist communist parties refused to join the CPRF,
such as the Russian Communist Workers' Party (RCWP) and the
All-Union Communist Workers' Party (UKPB), which refused to
recognize the 1993 constitution and therefore took no part
in elections. 27

Even without the support o·f these extremist

parties, the CPRF became the largest party in Russia, with

26

27

White, 42.
Sakwa, 179.
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a membership of over 500,000. 28
party, the Agrarian Party,

One other major communist

remained independent, but

functioned primarily as a rural branch of the CPRF. 29
Parties in the right-wing nationalist group varied
somewhat in terms of both ideology and level of extremism.
One of the most radical was the National Salvation Front
(NSF), which was declared unconstitutional by Boris Yeltsin
in October of 1992, but was reinstated by the
Constitutional Court in February 1993.

The NSF then became

one of the leaders of the military resistance to the
dissolution of parliament in September and October of 1993,
and was one of several parties to be banned from the 1993
Duma

elections.

The only nationalist party that did not

participate in the conflict, and therefore the only
nationalist party remaining at the time of the December
elections, was the obviously misnamed Liberal Democratic
Party of Russia (LDPR). 30
The LDPR is one of the best examples of a political
party based on the personality of its leader. The founder
of the Liberal Democrats, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, was a
charismatic campaigner who drew attention to himself and
his party with outlandishly nationalistic proposals, such

28

Sakwa, 179.

Marsh, 65.
30 Sakwa, 177-178.
29
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as the restoration of the Russian empire to encompass not
only the former Soviet Union, but also the entirety of the
former Tsarist empire, including Poland, Finland, and
Alaska. 31

In 1994, the Liberal Democrats added "the party

of Zhirinovsky" to their official name, and named
Zhirinovksy as chairman for life with the right to form the
party leadership any way he chose. 32
Although the ban on the nationalist parties that
participated in the confrontation between the president and
parliament in 1993 left LDPR the only nationalist party
eligible to contest that year's election, others were soon
to emerge.

Most notably, Derzhava(Great Power) led by

former vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoi, and the Congress
of Russian Communities, led by Yuri Skokov and Alekasandr
Lebed, competed with LDPR for the nationalist vote in 1995
and 1999,33 but the Liberal Democrats remain by far the
largest and most successful of the nationalist parties.
The third grouping consists of pro-government centrist
parties.

While the Russian president has never officially

joined a political party, parties have formed during each
Duma election with the purpose of supporting the policies
of the president and the presidentially appointed prime
Sakwa, 178.
White, 48.
33 Marsh, 79.

31

32
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minister.

In 1993, the leading party of presidential

support was Russia's Choice, led by Yegor Gaidar. 34

Before

the 1995 election, Viktor Chernomyrdin founded Our Home is
Russia (Nash Dom -- Rossiya, or NOR), to be the new party
of government support.

Many members of Russia's Choice

left the party to join NOR, and Yegor Gaidar rebuilt the
party as Russia's Democratic Choice and moved toward a
liberal reformist platform.

NOR espoused a vague program

supporting the further development of democracy, a market
economy, and stability, and lost its status as the "party
of power" when Chernomyrdin was dismissed as prime minister
in 1998. 35

For the 1999 elections, the new pro-government

party was the Interregional Movement Unity, commonly known
as "Unity" or by its Russian acronym "Medved."

This party

received explicit support from Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin, but was headed by leaders with limited political
exposure. 36

In addition to the officially acknowledged

"party of power," other parties developed with a platform
of supporting the presidential government.

Women of

Russia, which has competed in all three Duma elections, set
itself up as a kind of "women's branch" of the leading pro-

Marsh, 77.
White, 45.
36 Marsh, 88.

34
35
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government party,3? supporting the president's policies with
the additional objective of electing women to the Duma.

In

1999, Fatherland - All Russia (Otechestvo - Vsya Rossiya,
or OVR) , developed as an alternative pro-government party,
which had support among members of regional governments.
While OVR was not endorsed by Yeltsin or Putin( it did
support the policies they proposed. 38
The final group is composed of liberal reformist
parties.

The largest of these parties, and the only one

that has contested all three Duma elections, is Yabloko.
The name "Yabloko," which means "Apple" in Russian, is an
abbreviation of the names of the party's three founders,
Grigory Yavlinsky, Yuri Boldyrev, and Vladimir Lukin.
Yabloko was extremely critical of the Yeltsin government,
and it has cultivated an image as "the only democratic
alternative to the current regime.,,39

The remainder of

Russia's liberal reformists have presented a constantly
changing stream of somewhat chaotic parties, ranging from a
handful of parties in the 1993 election to the outrageous
number that competed in the 1995 election.

By the 1999

election most of these parties had joined to form the Union

White, 45.
Sakwa, 157.
39 White, 43.

37

38
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of Rightist Forces (Soyuz Pravikh Sil, or SPS), and were
able to run a more efficient campaign. 4o
The first electoral test of these parties came in the
Duma elections of December 1993.

Due to the executive-

legislative standoff that had ended with military action
that October, conditions were less than ideal for
contesting an election.

The leading critics of Yeltsin's

government, Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aleksandr Rustskoi,
remained in prison for their resistance to the dissolution
of parliament.

Sixteen political parties had been banned

on the grounds that they had been involved in the
confrontation, including

the National Salvation Front

(NSF)and the Russian Communist Workers' Party (RCWP).41

The

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) was
eventually legalized and allowed to take part in the
December elections, but the ban remained on most of the
others.

Eighteen newspapers were banned or suspended,

including Pravda and Sovetskaya Gazeta, which were required
to replace their editors before their suspensions could be
lifted, and the parliament's newspaper, Rossiiskaya Gazeta,
which was overtaken altogether by the Russian government.

42

Until October 18, a curfew was enforced and a ban remained

Marsh, 91.
White, 38.
42 White, 38.

40
41
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in place on public rallies and demonstrations,43 which made
campaigning almost impossible.
The ban on public rallies also presented parties with
difficulties in simply qualifying for the ballot.

The Duma

elections had been announced on September 21, but whether
or not they would actually take place remained uncertain
until the executive-legislative stalemate ended on October
4.

In order to be placed on the ballot, each party was

required to collect 100,000 signatures from across several
regions and register with the Central Election Commission
by November 6. 44

The task of collecting the signatures in

such little time was difficult for parties that had yet to
form strong organizational structures, and was made even
more difficult by the fact that during almost half of that
time it was illegal to hold a rally for the party's
supporters.
Out of over one hundred parties and electoral blocs
that had formed or were forming in the months before the
1993 elections, thirty-five attempted to qualify for the

ballot.

Twenty-one presented the CEC with the required

number of signatures, but eight of these failed to qualify
due to irregularities in the signature lists and

43
44

Marsh, 62.
Marsh, 63.
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accompanying documentation.

In all, thirteen parties were

placed on the ballot for the party list election. 45
Eight parties passed the five percent threshold
required to win Duma seats in the party list race.

The

nationalist LDPR won the most votes of any single party,
with 22.9 percent of the vote and fifty-nine party list
seats.

Three pro-government parties cleared the five

percent threshold: Russia's Choice with 15.5 percent of the
vote and forty party list seats, Women of Russia with 8.1
percent of the vote and twenty-one party list seats, and
the Democratic Party of Russia with 5.5 percent of the vote
and fourteen party list seats.

The two communist parties

on the ballot both received more than five percent of the
vote, with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation
(CPRF) winning 12.4 percent and thirty-two party list
seats, and the Agrarian party winning 7.9 percent and
twenty-one party list seats.

Of the liberal reformist

parties, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) won
6.8 percent of the vote and eighteen party list seats, and
Yabloko won 7.9 percent of the vote and twenty party list
seats.

45

Marsh, 63.

A total of 13 percent of the vote was cast either
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for parties that failed to pass the five percent threshold
or for the option of "against all parties. ff46
The majority of the district races were won by
independent candidates (136 out of 229).

The most

successful party in the district races was Russia's Choice,
winning twenty-five seats, and most other parties won at
least one single-member district seat.

Of the thirteen

parties on the ballot for the proportional representation
race, the only one that failed to win a single seat in the
Duma was the Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia
(CEDR)

.47

Procedures for registering for the ballot were changed
somewhat between the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections by the
Electoral Law of 1995.

The biggest change was in the

number of signatures required to be placed on the ballot.
The required number was raised from 100,000 to 200,000, and
no more than seven percent of the signatures could come
from anyone region. 48

Despite the more stringent

requirements, the party list race in 1995 included more
than three times as many parties as in 1993.

According to

the Central Electoral Commission {CEC), there were 273
groups that qualified as "political parties" or "electoral

Marsh, 67.
Marsh, 69.
48 Marsh, 73.
46
47
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organizations" and therefore had the right to attempt to be
placed on the party list ballot. 49

By May 1995, seventy-

nine parties had been registered by the Ministry of Justice
to participate in the elections, and after the process of
collecting and authenticating signatures was complete, the
ballot listed a total of forty-three parties. 5o
Out of the forty-three parties on the ballot in 1995,
only four passed the five percent threshold to receive
seats in the Duma.

The CPRF was the top finisher, with

22.3 percent of the vote and ninety-nine party list seats,
followed by the LDPR with 11.2 percent of the vote and
fifty party list seats, Our Home is Russia with 10.1
percent and forty-five seats, and Yabloko with 6.9 percent
of the vote and thirty-one party list seats.

Together,

these four parties received just over fifty percent of the
vote, which means that almost half of the votes cast in the
party list race went to parties that won no proportional
representation seats.
be

~wasted,"

elections.

Many people perceived these votes to

and some even challenged the legitimacy of the
Particularly unhappy with the outcome were the

parties that came within a few tenths of a percentage point
of clearing the threshold, such as Women of Russia with 4.6

49

White, 39.

50

Sakwa, 181.
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percent of the vote, and the Congress of Russian
Communities with 4.3 percent. 51
The Communist Party was also the most successful party
in the district races.

With fifty-eight seats, the CPRF

won almost three times as many of these elections as did
its closest competitor - its fellow communist Agrarian
Party, which won twenty seats.

With wins in seventy-seven

of the single-member district races, the independent
candidates were again more successful than any single
party; unlike 1993, however they didn't win a majority of
these races, as 148 seats went to candidates nominated by a
party. Other parties that did well in the district races
included Yabloko, with fourteen seats, Our Horne is Russia
with ten, and Russia's Democratic Choice and Power to the
People with nine seats each. 52
Although most won only one single member district
seat, a total of twenty-three parties received some
representation in the Duma. 53

That smaller parties would

have a better chance at winning single-member district
races than proportional representation seats in an election
with so many parties seems contrary to conventional wisdom.
In most cases, these parties won only one seat, which was

S'Marsh, 82-83.
52 White, 52.
S3 Marsh, 83.
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from the district where the party's leader was competing. 54
This is a result of the tendency of parties to form around
a charismatic leader with personal political ambitions and
strong local support, rather than around a platform or
ideology that could develop a nation-wide following.
The success of the Communist Party in the 1995 Duma
elections was commonly attributed to the voters'
dissatisfaction with existing conditions,55 but the
difference in electoral results between communist and
liberal parties can be better explained by differences in
organization and coordination.

While many voters did

express their dissatisfaction by voting for the CPRF, just
as many if not more voted for liberal reform parties.
Including "wasted" votes, the total number of votes
received by liberal reformist parties amounted to almost
thirty percent, roughly equal to the combined total of the
communist parties. 56
Lack of coordination also played a role in the
Communist victories in the district races.

Although there

were tentative agreements among some of the major parties
within each ideological grouping not to oppose one another
in some districts, in most districts party nominees found

5S

White, 52.
Marsh, 86.

56

Marsh. 83.

54
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themselves competing against candidates from like-minded
parties.

This was particularly true for the liberals, who

faced competition from numerous small parties as well as
the major parties that made attempts at coordination.

In

districts where support for liberal parties was strongest,
such as those in Moscow and St. Petersburg, as many as six
or seven liberal candidates competed against each other for
the single-member district seat. 57
In addition to the victories by the CPRF in 1995 that
were largely attributable to their superior organization,
the LDPR could also credit its success in 1993 to the
consolidation of like-minded voters.

After the other

nationalist parties were banned for their participation in
the parliament's resistance to dissolution, the LDPR was
left as the only party for which supporters of a
nationalist ideology could vote. 58

Taken as a whole, each

of the other groupings - communist, pro-government, and
liberal -- won roughly the same percentage of the vote. 59
The results in 1993 were not as shockingly disproportionate
to the actual votes received, because with a significantly
lower number of parties to split like-minded voters, a
greater number of parties representing a greater percentage
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of the vote were able to clear the five percent threshold.
The results of both the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections
clearly demonstrated the need for Russia's numerous
political parties to consolidate.
Recognizing the benefits of consolidation, several
parties have made attempts at working together.

One of the

earliest was a government-sponsored plan to create a twoparty system before the 1995 elections.

The idea was to

unite right-center parties into one bloc, which would be
led by Viktor Chernomyrdin, and to combine the left-center
parties into another bloc, to be led by Ivan Rybkin.

Both

groups faced problems with parties that were unwilling to
join and defections after the blocs had formed.

The left-

center bloc never really got off the ground, and the rightcenter bloc splintered and its remains became the progovernment party Our Home is Russia (NDR)

.60

Attempts have also been made to coordinate the
supporters of ideologically similar presidential
candidates.

When the 1996 presidential election appeared

to be a race between the incumbent Boris Yeltsin and the
leader of the Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov, several
liberal and centrist candidates dropped out of the race and
endorsed Yeltsin in order to avoid a split of the vote like
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the one that led to the CPRF's victory in 1995. 61

The

leading liberal candidate who refused to support Yeltsin
was Grigory Yavlinsky, one of the founders of Yabloko, and
one of the liberal politicians who had been most critical
of Yeltsin and his policies.

Despite Yeltsin openly

courting an alliance in the hope of gaining the seven to
ten percent of the voters that opinion polls showed as
supporting Yavlinsky,62 Yavlinsky remained in the race,
ultimately receiving 7.3 percent of the vote and not
significantly interfering with the eventual reelection of
Yelstin. 63
A more successful attempt at party cooperation was the
creation of the Union of Rightist Forces (SPS), a
collaboration of liberal parties for the 1999 election.

By

consolidating the support of most of the smaller liberal
parties that had contested the 1995 election, the SPS was
able to win 8.5 percent of the party list vote, thus
clearing the five percent threshold and earning twenty-four
seats in the Duma. 64

Again, the holdout among the liberals

was Yabloko, which was left as the only serious liberal
competitor for SPS.

Yabloko finished behind SPS in the
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1999 election, barely clearing the threshold with 5.93
percent of the vote and sixteen seats. 65
The 1999 elections as a whole showed a significant
improvement in party consolidation.

A total of twenty-six

parties competed in the party list race,66 which was a
considerable reduction from the forty-three parties that
competed in 1995.

More changes were made between 1995 and

1999 in the procedure for being registered for the party
list ballot.

Parties could still qualify by submitting

200,000 signatures with no more than seven percent coming
from anyone region, as they had done in 1995.

To register

for the 1999 ballot, however, there was the added option of
paying an electoral deposit of 25,000 times the minimum
wage, which amounted to approximately 80,000 US dollars.
seventeen of the twenty-six parties were placed on the
ballot in this manner. 67
Other changes included measures taken by the Central
Electoral Commission to prevent such a large number of
parties from entering the race.

New provisions in the

electoral law provided that parties who registered by
paying an electoral deposit and failed to receive at least
three percent of the vote would not get their deposits
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back.

Also, parties that received less than two percent of

the vote would have to repay the CEC funds that were
allocated to them during the campaign and repay the media
for the free airtime they were given. 68

These measures

provided a deterrent to smaller parties that were unlikely
to be able to meet the minimums, and provided an incentive
for parties to consolidate to increase their chances of
meeting the minimums, or at least to share the financial
burdens in the event of failure.
The results of the 1999 elections were considerably
more reflective of the votes cast than in 1995.

Six

parties surpassed the five percent threshold, and their
combined totals amounted to more than eighty-one percent of
the vote.

The CPRF was again the top finisher, with 24.29

per Gent of the vote.

This was an increase Qf almost two

percentage points from 1995, but because there were so many
fewer "wasted U votes to be redistributed to the top
finishers, the number of party list seats the CPRF received
fell from ninety-nine to sixty-seven.

The second place

finisher was the new pro-government party, Unity, with
23.32 percent of the vote and sixty-four seats.

The other

four parties to enter the Duma from the party lists were
Yabloko and SPS, as mentioned above; Zhironovsky's Bloc
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(the new name of the LDPR) with 5.98 percent of the vote
and 17 party list seats; and the regionally based progovernment party Fatherland - All Russia (OVR) with 13.32
percent of the vote for thirty-seven party list seats. 69
All seventeen parties that paid an electoral deposit to be
placed on the ballot failed to win the three percent of the
vote required in order to have the deposit returned to
them.

A total of eighteen parties received fewer than two

percent and had to repay the CEC and broadcast media for
their support during the campaign. 7o
The success of the SPS in the 1999 election and the
decline in support for Yabloko from 1995 led to attempts by
the two parties to coordinate their efforts in future
elections.

The dramatic difference in the electoral

failure of the highly fragmented liberal parties in the
1995 election and the success of mostly the same parties
consolidated under the umbrella of the SPS in 1999 would
seem to illustrate the benefits of cooperation.

The

incentive to work together should be even greater because
of a general trend in the support for liberal parties
shifting to the pro-government center since the 1999
election, which puts both parties in danger of not clearing
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the five percent barrier in 2003. 71

In spite of this,

attempts at an alliance have thus far been unsuccessful.
There are several possible reasons for Yabloko's
pervasive resistance to joining or collaborating with other
parties.

Many of these reasons are the same ones that have

hindered the coordinated development of Russia's party
system as a whole.

The most obvious reason sterns from the

strongly presidential system of government.

Yabloko's

leader, Grigory Yavlinsky, was a serious candidate in both
the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, and it seems
unlikely that he would be willing to give up his candidacy
in future elections by joining with another party that
might want to nominate its own candidate. Because of the
disproportionate power of the president compared to the
legislature, Yavlinsky may view the potential sacrifice of
success in the Duma election to be worth the guarantee of a
nomination in the presidential race.
The effects of years of one-party rule may also play a
factor in Yabloko's refusal to combine with another party.
Over the past decade, Yabloko has consistently taken a
position of staunch opposition to the government and has
been known for its refusal to compromise its positions in
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order to cooperate with other parties.

This ideological

absolutism may be the result of decades where no political
compromise was possible, and opposition to the government
was something that was longed for but impossible.

In the

first years of Russian electoral politics, Yabloko enjoyed
its image as

~the

one democratic alternative to the current

regime," and it may be unwilling to let go of its
reputation as a government antagonist by alligning itself
with the more government-friendly SPS.
Party politics in post-Soviet Russia have been
characterized by a lack of cohesion and a failure by most
parties to organize and campaign effectively.

Several

factors, which have their underlying causes in the effects
of Soviet rule and the government system that was adopted
in its wake, have presented challenges to developing
parties from their very beginning.

While the highly

fragmented Russian parties seem to be making gradual
progress towards a more cohesive and functional party
system, some of the same factors responsible for the
initial chaos are still causing problems for attempts at
further consolidation.
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